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____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 This appeal involves a suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 by a New Jersey resident who was arrested by 
municipal police for violating a public intoxication ordinance.  
At issue is whether a federal cause of action exists when one 
is arrested for violating an ordinance that might be invalid 
under state law.  We hold that it does not. 
I 
 In October 2007, Joseph McMullen was arrested in 
Maple Shade, New Jersey for violating the following 
ordinance: 
A. No Person shall be intoxicated or drunk 
or disorderly in any public street, lane, 
sidewalk, public parking lot, public or quasi-
public place or in any public conveyance or in a 
private motor vehicle while such vehicle is in 
motion or parked in any public street, lane or 
public parking lot or while upon any private 
property not his or her own without the express 
permission of the owner or other person having 
authority to grant such permission to the 
annoyance of any person or be so intoxicated or 
drunk as to be unable to conduct himself or 
herself with due care for his or her safety or the 
safety of other persons. 
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MAPLE SHADE TOWNSHIP, N.J., CODE § 142-2 (emphasis 
added).
1
  McMullen acknowledges being intoxicated at the 
time of his arrest, but denies acting disorderly. 
 During a hearing in Maple Shade Municipal Court, 
McMullen claimed the Township’s public intoxication 
ordinance was either superseded by or contrary to the New 
Jersey Alcoholism Treatment and Rehabilitation Act 
(ATRA).  See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2B-6 to -9.3, -11 to -39 
(West 2007).  ATRA provides: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no 
county, municipality, or other jurisdiction 
within the State shall adopt an ordinance, 
resolution, or other legislation creating an 
offense of public intoxication or any equivalent 
offense, and any existing ordinance, resolution, 
or other legislation creating such an offense is 
hereby repealed. 
Id. at § 26:2B-29.
2
  Persuaded by this argument, Municipal 
Judge Gregory R. McCloskey dismissed the charge against 
McMullen. 
                                                 
1
  The District Court correctly noted that McMullen 
“may have been arrested and prosecuted for violating a prior 
version of the [ordinance], previously codified at Maple 
Shade Township Code § 92-2(A) (1997).”  McMullen v. 
Maple Shade Twp., No. 08-2902, 2009 WL 3615035, at *1 
n.2 (D.N.J. Oct. 28, 2009).  This discrepancy is immaterial, 
however, because Section 92-2(A) is identical to § 142-2. 
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McMullen brought suit in the United States District 
Court for the District of New Jersey, alleging that § 142-2 of 
the Maple Shade Code was invalid under ATRA, and that his 
arrest and prosecution violated his Fourth Amendment right 
to be free from unreasonable seizures as well as his 
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law.
3
  
McMullen also brought various state law claims for violations 
of the New Jersey Constitution, the New Jersey Civil Rights 
Act, and the common law.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  The 
Township moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that McMullen failed to state a 
claim for violation of a federal right. 
 The District Court granted the Township’s motion to 
dismiss, stating that “[d]espite [McMullen’s] best efforts to 
dress-up [his] claim in the federal garb of the Fourth 
Amendment, at bottom, these claims remain state law 
claims.”  McMullen v. Maple Shade Twp., No. 08-2902, 2009 
                                                                                                             
2
  ATRA also prohibits municipalities from passing 
laws “rendering public intoxication or being found in any 
place in an intoxicated condition an offense,” or that are 
“inconsistent with the provisions and policies of th[e] act.”  
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2B-26 (West 2007). 
 
3
  Christopher Obchinetz, who was arrested and fined 
for violating the same ordinance, also sued, but was dismissed 
from this appeal by order dated July 26, 2010.  We also note 
that although McMullen repeatedly refers to this suit as a 
“class action,” he has made no attempt to certify a class.  
Consequently, the only parties to this action are McMullen 
and Maple Shade Township. 
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WL 3615035, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 28, 2009).  After dismissing 
McMullen’s federal claims, the Court declined to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims.  This 
appeal followed.
4 
 
II 
 We exercise plenary review over the dismissal of a 
complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
 
  See Atkinson v. 
LaFayette College, 460 F.3d 447, 451 (3d Cir. 2006).  “The 
District Court’s judgment is proper only if, accepting all 
factual allegations as true and construing the complaint in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiff, we determine that the 
plaintiff is not entitled to relief under any reasonable reading 
of the complaint.”  McGovern v. City of Philadelphia, 554 
F.3d 114, 115 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Phillips v. Cnty. of 
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2008)). 
III 
 This appeal requires us to consider whether an arrest 
made pursuant to an ordinance that may be invalid on state 
law grounds can give rise to a federal claim.  The District 
Court held that it may not.  The Court’s analysis focused on 
whether there is a federal right to engage in the conduct at 
issue in this case, namely public drunkenness.  After 
determining that such a right did not exist, the District Court 
dismissed McMullen’s federal claim.  Although the District 
Court stated that “it goes without saying that if New Jersey 
has, in fact, legalized public intoxication, then New Jersey 
                                                 
4
  The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367.  We have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. 
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localities should not enact or enforce laws prohibiting it,” it 
nevertheless concluded that “if they do [prohibit public 
intoxication], New Jersey state court is the proper forum for 
the resolution of the matter.”  McMullen, 2009 WL 3615035, 
at *4. 
Unlike the District Court, we do not believe the 
operative question in this case is whether there is a federally 
protected right to be intoxicated in public.  Instead, we frame 
the issue as whether there is a federally protected right to be 
free from arrest pursuant to a law alleged to be invalid on 
state law grounds. 
Section 1983 grants individuals “access to a federal 
forum for claims of unconstitutional treatment at the hands of 
state officials.”  Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 480 
(1994).  The statute provides: 
Every person, who, under color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any 
State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be 
subjected, any citizen of the United States or 
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to 
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and 
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 
proceeding for redress. 
42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Thus, by its terms, § 1983 provides a 
remedy for violations of federal, not state or local, law. 
Some of our sister circuit courts of appeals have stated 
that an arrest pursuant to a statute that has been invalidated on 
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federal constitutional grounds may give rise to a Fourth 
Amendment claim.  See Amore v. Novarro, 624 F.3d 522, 532 
(2d Cir. 2010) (“[W]e assume that it is clearly established that 
an arrest under a statute that has been authoritatively held to 
be unconstitutional is ordinarily a constitutional violation.”); 
Leonard v. Robinson, 477 F.3d 347, 358 (6th Cir. 2007) 
(stating that a statute held unconstitutional by the Michigan 
Court of Appeals could not support probable cause to arrest); 
Cooper v. Dillon, 403 F.3d 1208, 1223 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(imposing municipal liability for enforcement of a statute 
held to violate the First Amendment, but granting qualified 
immunity because the statute’s invalidity was not clearly 
established). 
In this appeal, the Township contends that an arrest 
based on a law that is invalid only on state law grounds does 
not violate the Fourth Amendment.  In support of its 
argument, the Township cites City of Ontario v. Quon, --- 
U.S. ---, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2632 (2010), in which the Supreme 
Court held that a search made in violation of a statute is not 
per se unreasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes.  We 
find the Court’s holding in Quon inapposite.  Although it is 
true that an arrest made in violation of state law does not 
necessarily give rise to a federal constitutional claim,
5
 the 
                                                 
5
  Many states have enacted laws that afford 
individuals protections beyond those found in the United 
States Constitution.  But arrests made in violation of these 
state laws are not, in and of themselves, actionable under § 
1983.  See, e.g., Virginia v. Moore, 533 U.S. 164, 168 (2008) 
(search incident to arrest that was illegal under state law not 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment);  Pyles v. Raisor, 
60 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir. 1995) (right under Kentucky law 
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issue in this appeal is whether an arrest pursuant to an 
allegedly invalid municipal ordinance directly offends the 
federal constitutional right to be free from unlawful arrest.  
As noted previously, other courts of appeals have held that an 
arrest made pursuant to a statute that has been declared 
unconstitutional violates the Fourth Amendment.  These 
decisions are not predicated on the reason for a statute’s 
invalidity; rather, they are animated by the principle that an 
unambiguously invalid law cannot, by itself, provide probable 
cause to arrest.  Cf. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 208 
(1973) (plurality opinion) (stating that state officers may only 
enforce state law “[u]ntil judges say otherwise”); Doe v. 
Metro. Police Dep’t, 445 F.3d 460, 469 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 
(holding that a state statute that is unambiguously civil cannot 
form the basis for a proper arrest, and may support a claim 
                                                                                                             
not to be arrested by officer who was not present when 
misdemeanor was committed does not support § 1983 claim); 
Barry v. Fowler, 902 F.2d 770 (9th Cir. 1990) (refusing to 
allow a § 1983 claim based solely on a violation of state law); 
Clark v. Link, 855 F.2d 156, 163 (4th Cir. 1988) (“[A] section 
1983 claim can only be sustained by allegations and proof of 
a violation of the Constitution or statutes of the United States 
and specifically may not rest solely on a violation of state 
statutes or qualify as a common law tort.”); Moore v. 
Marketplace Restaurant, Inc., 754 F.2d 1336, 1349 (7th Cir. 
1985) (“[A]n alleged violation of a state statute does not give 
rise to a corresponding § 1983 violation, unless the right 
encompassed in the state statute is guaranteed under the 
United States Constitution.”).  In each of these cases, 
probable cause existed independent of state law.  By contrast, 
McMullen argues that because Maple Shade’s ordinance was 
invalid, it cannot provide probable cause for an arrest. 
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under § 1983).  Thus, in certain circumstances, an arrest 
pursuant to a law that is unambiguously invalid for reasons 
based solely on state law grounds may constitute a Fourth 
Amendment violation actionable under § 1983. 
Here, however, McMullen has failed to state a viable 
Fourth Amendment claim because he cannot plead that the 
ordinance pursuant to which he was arrested is 
unambiguously invalid.  McMullen’s cause of action hinges 
on ATRA’s alleged preemption of the Maple Shade public 
intoxication ordinance.  It is unclear, however, that the 
ordinance is in fact preempted.  It does not prohibit simple 
public intoxication, but rather proscribes intoxication “to the 
annoyance of any person” or to the degree that the individual 
is “unable to conduct himself or herself with due care for his 
or her safety or the safety of other persons.”  MAPLE SHADE 
TOWNSHIP, N.J., CODE § 142-2. 
Complicating matters further, another provision of 
New Jersey state law—the Home Rule Act—authorizes “[t]he 
governing body of every municipality to make, amend, repeal 
and enforce ordinances to . . . [p]revent vice, drunkenness and 
immorality; . . . [and to] [r]estrain and punish drunkards, 
vagrants, mendicants and street beggars.”  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
40:48-1.
6
  The apparent conflict between ATRA and the 
Home Rule Act creates additional ambiguity regarding the 
validity of Maple Shade’s public intoxication ordinance. 
                                                 
 
6
  Although this provision of the Home Rule Act was 
originally enacted in 1917, the Act has been amended as 
recently as 2003 without substantive changes to the provision 
authorizing municipalities to enact public intoxication 
ordinances.  See 2003 N.J. Sess. Law. Serv. 1763. 
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Although there is some indication that New Jersey 
municipal courts have interpreted ATRA expansively, see 
State v. Navarro, 392 A.2d 1272, 1272 (Pilesgrove Twp. 
Mun. Ct. 1978) (finding that New Jersey’s public intoxication 
statute was preempted by ATRA, but not discussing the 
Home Rule Act or municipal public intoxication laws), no 
conclusive decision has been rendered with respect to this 
issue.  Because it is not the domain of federal courts to 
resolve undecided questions of state law, cf. R.R. Comm’n of 
Tex. v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941) (holding that 
federal courts should abstain from deciding constitutional 
questions relating to state laws when there is a possibility that 
state courts may interpret the laws in a way that alters or 
eliminates the federal question), we must reject McMullen’s 
invitation to serve as an arbiter of New Jersey law and leave 
that task to the New Jersey Supreme Court. 
IV 
For the reasons stated, we hold that McMullen’s claim 
is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  The judgment of 
the District Court will be affirmed. 
1 
 
Joseph W. McMullen v. Maple Shade Township, No. 09-4479 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge, concurring 
 
I join in the judgment of the Court that Maple Shade 
Township is not liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for passing the 
ordinance at issue here.  However, I write separately because 
I would not proceed on this record to create a new 
precedential standard making the validity of a municipal 
ordinance under state law relevant to a Fourth Amendment 
inquiry.  As the Majority notes (slip op. at 8-10), Maple 
Shade’s public drunkeness ordinance, MAPLE SHADE 
TOWNSHIP, N.J., CODE § 142-2, has not been held invalid 
under New Jersey law and, to the contrary, can reasonably be 
read as being consistent with the state’s Alcoholism 
Treatment and Rehabilitation Act (“ATRA”), N.J. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 26:2B-6 to -9.3, -11 to -39 (West 2007).  Therefore, 
accepting for purposes of argument that the plaintiff’s 
contention concerning the validity of the ordinance is relevant 
to a Fourth Amendment analysis, we would still be hard-
pressed to say that New Jersey law is such that Maple Shade 
could be found liable under § 1983.
1
  The Majority 
                                              
1
 The whole exercise of deciding what state law is and 
then having that be the basis of liability under § 1983 is 
suspect.  The Majority accurately states that “§ 1983 provides 
a remedy for violations of federal, not state or local, law.”  
(Slip op. at 6.)  Yet the Majority is creating a constitutional 
standard under which the Fourth Amendment reasonableness 
of an arrest turns on whether a local law is invalid for 
violating state, not federal, law.  “Th[at] constitutional 
standard would be only as easy to apply as the underlying 
state law, and state law can be complicated indeed.”  Virginia 
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acknowledges as much, and it is not necessary to go any 
further.   
 
Thus, the question of whether the validity of a 
municipal ordinance under state law is relevant to a Fourth 
Amendment inquiry is not one we need to address to resolve 
this case.  Because the plaintiff’s fundamental premise that 
the Maple Shade ordinance and ATRA are necessarily in 
conflict is unsound, we should simply point that out and 
affirm the District Court in a non-precedential opinion.  Cf.  
Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S.Ct. 808, 819 (2009) (“A 
constitutional decision resting on an uncertain interpretation 
of state law is … of doubtful precedential importance.”); 
Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105, 
(1944) (“If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any 
other in the process of constitutional adjudication, it is that we 
                                                                                                     
v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 175 (2008).  It is true that the 
Majority frames its test in terms of “an arrest pursuant to a 
law that is unambiguously invalid … on state law grounds” 
(slip op. at 8), but deciding whether something is ambiguous 
or not is, ironically, easier said than done, and the very 
question of ambiguity will now mean that municipalities like 
Maple Shade are going to be subject to the expense of federal 
litigation more frequently.  The Supreme Court has observed 
that “it is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state 
sovereignty than when a federal court instructs state officials 
on how to conform their conduct to state law.”  Pennhurst 
State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 
(1984).  That observation is not without force when 
considering the actions of local governments and officials 
trying to comply with state law. 
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ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality … unless 
such adjudication is unavoidable.”); Egolf v. Witmer, 526 
F.3d 104, 109-10 (3d Cir. 2008) (declining to address the 
merits of First and Fourth Amendment claims which turned 
on an unsettled state law question when another avenue for 
disposition was available, because “federal courts do a 
disservice to state actors who would be induced to rely on a 
ruling that might change altogether upon subsequent review 
by the state court”).  
